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A PRIMER ON TRADEMARK LAW AND
INTERNET ADDRESSES
by DAvm J. LouNDyt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Quite a bit has been written in the recent past about trademark'
issues surrounding the registration and use of Internet domain names.
Since these articles have been written, there have been a number of new
and significant cases decided, and new legislation has passed which affects domain name disputes. This article examines these cases and
presents a more complete primer on trademark and dilution law as it
pertains to various aspects of Internet addressing, including domain
names.
Using a series of examples-some hypothetical, and some drawn
from real incidents-this paper will step through a legal analysis of the
addresses' use, and will examine situations in which an infringement
may occur.
II. INTERNET ADDRESSES
Computers connected together via the Internet are able to send information back and forth because each connected machine (often referred
to as a "host")2 possesses a unique address. Each Internet Protocol ("IP")
address takes the form of four sets of numbers, separated by periods, or
"dots." The IP number system is coordinated by, and numbers are assigned under the authority of, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
("IANA7) which receives its charter from the Internet Society and the
Federal Network Council. These IP numbers are long and hard to remember. They are what computers understand and use to route traffic
on the Internet.
t Mr. David J. Loundy has a B.A. from Purdue Univeristy and a J.D. from Iowa
School of Law.
1. For the sake of convenience, in most cases trademarks and servicemarks will be
dealt with synonymously.
2. See, G. Malkin, Internet Users' Glossary, RFC 1983 (Aug. 1996) <http'/
www.internic.netrfc/rfc 1983.txt> (providing a glossary of terms).
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For convenience, humans use "domain names" instead.3 The purpose for creating the domain name system was to make human access to
machines on the Internet easier-not to identify trademarks. The domain name system, however, was also created before the explosive
growth of the Internet and the vast increase in commercial interest in
the network.
There are different "levels" to a domain name. Starting at the right
end of an Internet e-mail address is the "top level" domain. These may be
country codes, such as .us or .au, or they may be "international Top Level
Domains" such as .com or .org.4 The IANA decides who will manage
these top level domains-in other words, who will register any "second
level" names within a specific top level domain. Currently, the National
Science Foundation is responsible for the registry of .com, .org, .edu, and
.net domains. It, in turn, has licensed management to Network Solu5
tions, Inc. ("NSI") which maintains the InterNIC Internet Registry.
Thus, to get a second-level domain name, an organization applies to
the appropriate registry e.g., the InterNIC for a .com address. Names
are generally given out by top-level registries on a first-come, first-served
basis without determining the legality of the registering organization's
use of that name. 6 The second-level domain holder may then act as a
registry for third-level domains within the second-level domain, or may
7
assign host names within the second-level domain.
3. For instance, as of this writing, the e-mail address of the author at
David@Loundy.com is equivalent to David@206.54.248.130; however, for complex technical
reasons, e-mail sent to the second address probably will not arrive.
4. Often referred to in abbreviated form as "iTLDs." Some refer to these as "generic
Top Level Domains'" or "gTLDs."
5. See generally, Jon Postel, Domain Name System Structure and Delegation, RFC
1591 (Mar. 1994) <http'//www.internic.net/rfc/rfcl591.txt> (describing top level domain
name registries).
6. See, e.g., Network Solutions' Domain Name Dispute Policy (Sept. 9, 1996) <ftp'//
rs.internic.net/policy/internic>.
7. Just to add to the confusion, host names may match domain names. Loundy.com,
for instance, refers to both the second-level domain name, loundy, in the .com top-level
domain, but it also refers to the host located at that address. Worse still, using the concepts of "aliasing" and "virtual hosts" one machine or domain name can be made to look like
another, or part of another. Loundy.com is a "virtual host"-while it "appears" to be a
separate machine, it is merely a directory on a machine in the domain of one of the author's
service providers, located in the domain netural.com. By using such aliases, if an organization uses one service provider to maintain an Internet presence, and the organization
wishes to change service providers, the "alias" can be changed for the underlying host, thus
allowing the organization to keep the same Internet address. In other words, while
loundy.com is an alias for a machine operated by one provider, users only need to know the
loundy.com address. If necessary, loundy.com can be maintained by a new provider-the
loundy.com address does not change, even though the machine for which it is an alias does
change. This is another reason why using domain names is easier than using the underlying IP numbers. A name is an alias for an IP number. Should the IP number for a host
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Once a machine is given an address, the system operator of that host
assigns "accounts" or "UserIDs" or "logins" to users of that host. While
not a portion of the domain name, this account name will show up in
various places in various types of Internet addresses. For instance, different services may be available for each user ID. Each account will
likely have an electronic mailbox, and thus an e-mail address of the form
"mailto:UserID@machine.second-level-domain.iTLD." 8 Each account
may have an FTP (file transfer protocol) directory (or gopher space) set
up for the account holder. Such an address would look like "ftp:ll
machine.second-level-domain.iTLD/-UserID/." Perhaps the user will
also have a web page set up in its account, and thus have the address
"http://machine.second-level-domain.iTLD/UserID/."
While much of the controversy surrounding Internet addressing disputes has been at the second-level domain name stage, the potential for
trademark and unfair competition disputes encompass more than just
these second-level domain name conflicts. 9 For instance, UserIDs (in email addresses or user directories), when coupled with domain names,
may serve to either enhance or reduce any likelihood of confusion. 10
III. EXAMPLES TO EXAMINE
The following series of examples demonstrate trademark issues surrounding Internet addresses.
change, the name stays the same, any re-numbering thus does not require the machine
users to learn new names as well.
8. For example, the author can be reached at the e-mail address
david@flowbee.interaccess.com. The top-level domain is .com, administered by the InterNIC. "Interaccess" is the second-level domain, administered by the Internet service provider InterAccess. "Flowbee" is the name of one of the service provider's machines, and
"david" is the "username" or "UserID" of an account holder on the service provider's
machine.
9. G. Peter Albert, Jr., Right on the Mark: Defining the Nexus Between Trademarks
and Internet Domain Names, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 277 (1996) (discussing disputes between trademarks and domain names). See generally, G. Andrew Barger,
Cybermarks:A ProposedHierarchicalModeling System of Registration and Internet Architecture for Domain Names, 29 J. MAsHALL L. REv. 623 (1996) (discussing domain names
acting as trademarks or servicemarks).
10. For instance, in one of the first popular articles to raise the issue of domain name
piracy, Joshua Quittner registered the domain name "mcdonalds.com," after warning the
hamburger giant that the domain that matched its corporate name was available. Joshua
Quittner, Billions Registered, WIED, Oct. 1994, at 50. While there is nothing inherently
confusing about Mr. Quittner having registered the domain name mcdonalds.com, the potential for confusion and abuse becomes more clear at the end of Quittner's article where he
ponders what to do with the name he has registered. One possibility he comes up with is
seeing if McDonald's competitor Burger King would like to buy the domain name. He finally ends the article by soliciting suggestions as to the fate of the domain name by having
readers e-mail suggestions to ronald@mcdonald.com. Id. at 56. "Ronald McDonald" is, of
course, McDonald's spokesclown.
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TRADEMARKS AS SECOND-LEVEL DOMAINS: INTERMATIC.COM &
PANAVISION.COM

The first examples are a result of Dennis Toeppen. Dennis Toeppen,
President of Net66, an Illinois Internet Service Provider, has been called
a number of things, one of which is a "domain name squatter."
Domain names have value. Organizations wishing a location on the
Internet need to locate themselves at some address. Most organizations,
especially commercial entities want to locate themselves on the Internet
at an address where their customers can find them, and at addresses
that can be remembered easily. Therefore, for an organization, the ideal
case would be to have an Internet address at a second-level domain that
matches its business name or the name of its products. Thus, Internet
users who wish to find the company may be able to guess at the company's location without knowing for sure where the company is located.
For instance, if you want to find the web page for Apple Computer, you
could guess that it might be located at http://www.apple.com/ (and you
would be right). Because domain names are unique, only one organization can get any name in a particular top level domain. You might guess,
for instance, that Apple Records might be located at http://
www.apple.com (and you would be wrong because Apple Computer registered the address first). Although a variant of a particular name may be
available, registering such a variant makes an organization less easy to
find on the Internet. For instance, Apple Records could register applerecords.corn or some such variant, but such a name would be less intuitive for people to guess.
Because some particular domain names are likely to have more
value, people such as Mr. Toeppen have registered names that they
thought other companies may want and be willing to pay to get.1 1 Two of
the names Toeppen has speculated in, which have resulted in lawsuits,
are panavision.com 12 and intermatic.com. 13 Attempts to "ransom," these
names, as we shall see, have been Mr. Toeppen's undoing.
11. Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") which maintains the registry for some of the most
popular top-level domains, including the .com domain (intended primarily to designate
commercial entities) has put into place a succession of policies designed to address conflicts
over domain name ownership. The policies have worked to allow trademark holders to "get
back" "their" domains from squatters who have reserved the matching domain name. However, NSI's policies and their merits are only one option to resolve domain name conflicts,
and are beyond the scope of this article.
12. Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter,
Panavision].
13. Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996) [hereinafter,
Intermatic].
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SECOND-LEVEL DOMAINS THAT ARE SIMILAR TO TRADEMARKS:
MICROSOFT.COM

Another example of a trademark controversy is the Zero Micro incident. Zero Micro is an Austin, Texas based software business that registered the domain name microsOft.com- that is spelled: M-I-C-R-0-S[zero]-F-T. At the web address http://www.microsOft.com, the company
put up a page making fun of the "real" Microsoft, the Redmond, Washington software giant, and its president, Bill Gates. Zero Micro's Internet address, microsOft.com looks similar to (or exactly like) Microsoft's
microsoft.com address, however there is no way to communicate with
Zero Micro without knowing that the addresses are in fact different. After complaints were filed with the InterNIC, the domain name was
placed on "hold" effectively taking it off of the Internet. 1 4 Later, even the
15
registration was removed from the InterNIC database.

C.

TRADEMARKS AS THIRD-LEVEL DOMAINS/MACHINE NAMES:
HONDA.PURDUE.EDU

Large organizations will often have many machines connected to the
Internet, all addressed under their second-level domain name. Perhaps
they will even have sub-networks organized under their domain name.
In such cases, machines and sub-networks often employ logical naming
schemes for administrative convenience and communication ease.16 An
example of a naming scheme is the University of Iowa Student Computing Association, which names its machines after food processor speedswhip.isca.uiowa.edu, chop.isca.uiowa.edu, grind.isca.uiowa.edu, etc. In
some cases, this can also raise trademark concerns. For instance, a former associate of the author, a car aficionado, named his office machines
after car companies-honda.purdue.edu, saturn.purdue .edu. 1 7 Finding
Universities with host names named after various types of trademarked
entities is not uncommon.
D.

TRADEMARKS

AS USERIDs: WWW.NEXCHI.COM/SONY/ &
SONY@NEXCHI.COM

In addition to appearing in the domain name, there are a number of
other places where a trademark might appear in relation to Internet addressing. If a user has a trademarked name as a UserID, it will appear
in an e-mail address, e.g., sony@nexchi.com, or as part of the address in a
14. The Web page has been moved to http'/microsOft.paranoia.com/.
15. See Id.
16. See, D. Libes, Choosing a Name for Your Computer, RFC 1178, (Aug. 1990) <http'/l
www.internic.netrfcrfc178.txt> (analyzing machine names and recommendations on how
to choose a good one).

17. The names have been changed to protect the guilty.
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web page, e.g., www.nexchi.com /sony/. 1 8
IV. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
The following examines the relevant law concerning the issues discussed above on Internet addresses.
The Lanham Act 19 protects registered marks and unregistered
marks from uses that are likely to cause confusion. Unregistered marks
are protected by section 43 (a). 20 More specifically, any use in commerce
of a word, name, symbol, etc. in connection with goods or services which
presents the mark in a manner which is likely to mislead another as to
the source or origin or sponsorship of the goods or services, is an
infringer.
Marks are often classified in terms of their strength, or ability to
uniquely identify goods and services. The stronger the mark, the more
likely it is to be a protectable mark. The classes range from: (1) generic,
(2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, to (5) fanciful. 2 1 Generic
marks are not registerable as trademarks because they are necessary to
refer to a class of goods, 22 while terms "which are arbitrary, fanciful, or
suggestive as applied to a given product or service are naturally under23
stood by the consuming public as designations of origin."
In one sense, a domain name is like a street address-it indicates
the "location" of an entity on the Internet. One does not usually think of,
say, a street address as being a source of goods or services, one usually
thinks of the entity at an address as being the source. However, in another sense, a domain name does resemble a source-identifier because
the domain name indicates with what entity information at that address
originated. While a geographical address may be required to refer to a
location, and thus may be "generic" and not likely to be registerable as a
trademark owned by a business at that address, this assumes that the
business takes its mark from a fixed address. 24 With Internet addresses,
the address is generally taken to match the business' mark.
Once an entity has a domain name registered, there are a number of
services which can be operated at that domain, as has already been men18. These addresses have been made-up for this article.
19. Trademark Act § 32, 15 U.S.C.A. §1114 (West Supp. 1996).
20. Trademark Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §1125 (West Supp.1996).
21. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).

22. Id.
23. Walt-West Enter., Inc. v. Gannett Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 1050, 1057 (7th Cir. 1982)
(discussing the likelihood of confusion between two radio station frequency designations).
24. See, Dan L. Burk, Trademarks along the Infobahn:A FirstLook at the Emerging
Law of Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (Apr. 10, 1995) <http'//www.urich.edu/-jolt/vlil/
burk.html> (analyzing the interplay between trademarks, domain names, and geographical addresses).
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tioned. Some common examples would include setting up a World Wide
Web page from which to make information available, setting up a file
transfer protocol archive to distribute files, send and receive e-mail from
the domain. The domain name used for these services may have nothing
to do with any goods or services being offered at the site, and, in fact,
there may not be any goods or services that are publicly available from a
site. For instance, a company could register a domain name only for the
purpose of sending and receiving e-mail between remote company offices.
It may have only a limited access bulletin board system set up at the
domain that is not accessible without proper authorization. In such instances, only a fairly sophisticated Internet user may be able to find out
anything about the domain and its ownership, which is unlikely to produce confusion, because the public is denied access to interaction that
may cause confusion. Likewise when the domain name gets used publicly, the likelihood of confusion starts to rise.
To find a likelihood of confusion, courts look at a number of factors.
A typical set of factors a court looks at include the following: (1) the degree of similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion; (2)
the similarity of products or services for which the name is used; (3) the
area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree of care likely to be
exercised by consumers; (5) the strength of the complainant's mark; (6)
actual confusion; and (7) an intent on the part of the alleged infringer to
palm-off his products as those of another. 25 Other courts add additional
factors, such as whether the senior mark holder is likely to "bridge the
gap" and start marketing its services
or goods in the markets in which
26
the junior user uses the mark.
Obviously these factors must be applied on a case-by-case basis.
However, the issue is not whether the marks themselves would be confused for each other, but rather whether the use of a similar mark will
cause consumers to confuse the 7source of the goods or services as being
2
that of the senior mark owner.

Because only one person can register any particular domain name
though several people could possibly register similar domain names, the
25. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1235 (citing Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum Ltd., 903
F.2d. 434, 439 (7th Cir. 1990); see also, Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397
(8th Cir. 1987), Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp.
1546, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (listing the 11th Circuit's factors).
26. Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217,
1225 (2nd Cir. 1987); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961); Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Denarius, Ltd., 817 F. Supp
1103, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831
(6th Cir. 1983).
27. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1235 (citing Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enter., 6 F.3d
1225, 1228-29 (7th Cir. 1993)). See also, Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1226 (2d Cir. 1987).
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context of a domain name's use becomes particularly important. As one
author describes it:
Considered in the abstract, there is no particular reason to suppose
that cybernauts happening upon a domain designated 'McDonalds.com'
or 'Kaplan.com' would associate those sites with a source of hamburgers
or testing services in real space- the world is full of individuals named
McDonald and Kaplan, any of whom might have registered such domain names with the InterNIC. This seems to weaken the presumption
of distinctiveness for arbitrary marks transported to the new medium.
By contrast, a site designated with a fanciful name such as Exxon.com'
seems inherently distinctive whether in real space or cyberspace. And a
when used to desiggeneric mark from real space may become arbitrary
28
nate a domain name such as 'muffln.com.'
Thus, "proximity" of the marks, i.e. the goods or services "labeled"
with the mark, and how similar they are to each other 2is9 likely to be
more important on the Internet than in the "real world."
In the case of a company using a second-level domain name that
matches the name of another's mark, and who uses that domain to publicly peddle a product aimed at the same target audience, courts have not
had difficulty in finding that the use of the domain name
may create a
30
likelihood of confusion and therefore may be enjoined.
If the domain name used is not identical to a mark, the likelihood of
confusion based on the address alone decreases. While other factors may
still lead to confusion, a difference in an Internet address may make a
tremendous difference. For instance, using the wrong host name in an email address will send your message to a different entity than the one
you intended to mail. While Internet users have traditionally been fairly
sophisticated and would likely be able to distinguish even small differences in an Internet address, with the increasing ease of use which, in
part, has lead to the huge growth of the Internet and the increase in new
users, this assumption as to sophistication may no longer be safe to
28. Dan L. Burk, Trademarksalong the Infobahn:A FirstLook at the Emerging Law of
Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH., 9 62 (Apr. 10, 1995) <http://www.urich.edu/-jolt/vlil/
burk.html>. See Albert, supra note 9, at 101.
29. Id. at 63.
30. Juris has demonstrated a likelihood of success of proving that Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, The Comp Examiner Agency, Inc., and Counterclaim Defendant Mr.

Rene Thomas Folse (collectively "TCE") are infringing Juris' registered trademark through
TCE's use of an identical mark "juris"as a second level domain name and Web site on the
computer medium of the Internet and through other marketing channels to sell, distribute,
advertise, and/or market its goods and services to Juris' target market of lawyers and law
firms, because TCE's use of the "juris"mark is likely to cause confusion as to the source or
sponsorship of those goods and services, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125. Comp Examiner
Agent, Inc. v. Juris, Inc, No. 96-0213-WMB (CTX), 1996 WL 376600 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26,

1996).
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3l

make.
Use of a mark in Internet addresses beyond just the domain name
may also lead to confusion, especially to a novice Internet user. For instance, the same UserID may exist on many different machines. Thus
placing an on-line order by sending e-mail to "order@bookseller.com" is
not the same as sending your mail to "order@bookcellar.com." The same
likelihood of confusion factors would have to be applied to other uses of a
trademark beyond just their use in a second-level domain name.
Also noteworthy is infringement by "reverse confusion," which is
perhaps a more likely occurrence on the Internet than it is off-line. An
infringement by reverse confusion occurs when a junior user of a mark
saturates a market with a similar mark to the point where it overpowers
the senior mark causing people to misattribute goods and services or affiliation of the senior user to the junior user. 32 This would happen, for
instance, when a large company with a tremendous advertising budget
creates and markets a new product under a name used by an existing
smaller company. Because the large company can promote the product
vigorously, the new product may eclipse the older product to the point
where consumers think that the senior mark holder must be related to
the new user. The reason why such claims are more likely on the Internet is due to the medium's equalizing ability. A small entity that puts
up a web page reaches the same international audience as a large conglomerate, and vice versa. For example, new ventures can have stunning web presences, e-mail auto-responders, mailing lists, a news group
or bulletin board system devoted to product discussions and support. On
the other hand, an established business may make very poor use of the
available technology and get lost in a back corner of Cyberspace.
V. DILUTION STATUTES
Nearly half of the States have "dilution" or "anti-dilution" statutes in
order to prevent impairing the value of a trademark, even if the use of
the mark does not produce a likelihood of confusion.3 3 Competition or
confusion are not requirements for a finding of dilution.3 4 Because many
31. Burk, supra note 28, at ' 68.
32. See, e.g., Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Tech. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987)
(noting small industrial oil reclaiming company's use of Ameritech mark could be overwhelmed by multi-state telephone company adopting the same name and similar logo); Tsiolis v. Interscope Records, Inc., No. 96 C 6318, 1996 WL 657830 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 1996)
(stating that the "Aftermath" mark used by band is too weak to protect from any reverse
confusion caused by celebrity musician adopting name for record label).
33. Summary of Testimony of the International Trademark Association on H.R. 1295
and 1270 avalaible in 1995 WL 435750 (July 19, 1995).
34. See, e.g., Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 399 N.Y. 2d
628, 632 (N.Y. 1977).
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trademarks reach a national market, these state statutes have long been
considered inadequate in the protection they offer. As a result, in January of 1996, subsection (c) was added to section 43 of the Lanham Act
("Act") in order to provide a national remedy for dilution of "famous"
marks.3 5 The legislative history to the Act indicates that it was intended
to apply to domain names, and specifically work to remedy the problem
of one entity registering the domain name that matches another entities
36
famous mark.
The Federal Dilution Act is similar to many of the state dilution
statutes, and one court has said that it mirrors the "traditional New
York dilution analysis" which allows for dilution by tarnishment or by
blurring.3 7
This Federal Dilution Act provides the following:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an
injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become
fa38
mous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.
Of course, one of the first questions to ask is whether the mark is
famous. 3 9 The Federal Dilution Act lists eight factors, not intended to be
all-inclusive, to use in determining if a mark is famous for purposes of
the Act:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with
the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the
mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is
used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and
channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against
whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by
third parties; and
35. 15 U.S.C.A. §1125 (c) (West Supp. 1996).

36. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1238 (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.).
37. Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corp., No. 96 Civ. 7045 (SAS), 1996 WL 583395, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1996).
38. 15 U.S.C.A. §1125(c)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
39. Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 1996 WL 511639 at *5 (S.D. Miss. May 3,
1996) (stating dilution statutes will only protect marks that are truly distinct, as indicated
by the mark's strength). Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir.
1983).
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(H) whether the mark was registered.. 4o
Importantly, the Act has a provision exempting "fair use" of the
mark in comparative advertising, non-commercial uses of the mark, and
"[all forms of news reporting and news commentary." 4 1 Senator Moorhead, in the legislative history of the Act, specifically stated that this
exemption was intended to
address the legitimate first amendment concern espoused by the broadcasting industry and the media. The bill would not prohibit or threaten
noncommercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial, and other
42
forms of expression that are not a part of a commercial transaction.
Thus, the statute requires that the use of a mark, or domain name,
be a commercial use. The statute also requires that the use of the mark
43
be made "in commerce."
The second element necessary to find dilution of a mark is a likelihood of actual dilution. 4 4 Dilution may take one of two forms: tarnish45
ment or blurring.
A. TARNsHmENT
Dilution by tarnishment occurs when a famous mark is linked to
poor quality or unwholesome products, or otherwise displayed in a derogatory manner. 46 If the use of the mark does not result in negative associations for the senior trademark user, then there is no dilution by
tarnishment. 4 7 An example of tarnishment in the use of a domain name
is the Hasbro case.4 8 In this case, the operator of an adult entertainment web site registered the domain name candyland.com as an Internet
40. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West Supp.1996).
41. Id. at (c)(4).
42. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 Cong. Rec.
H14317 (1995). See also Summary of Testimony of the InternationalTrademark Association on H.R. 1295 and 1270 available in 1995 WL 435750 (July 19, 1995). Failure to consider these free speech implications caused an earlier attempt to pass such a dilution
statute to fail. See, David S. Villwock, The Federal DilutionAct of 1995, 6 DEPAuL-LCA J.
ART & ENT. L. 213, 221 (1996).
43. 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c)(1) (West Supp.1996). 15 U.S.CA. § 1127 (West Supp.1996)
(defining "in commerce").
44. Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 1996 WL 511639 at *5 (S.D. Miss. May 3,
1996). See also, Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983);
Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1994); Tiffany &
Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp 836, 843 (D. Mass. 1964) (holding that creation of a
Tiffany's restaurant infringes on the Tiffany mark owned by the jewelry manufacturer).
45. Id.
46. Panavision,945 F. Supp. at 1300.
47. See, e.g., Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corp., No. 96 Civ. 7045 (SAS), 1997 WL 583395
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1996).
48. Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., No. C96-13OWD, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11626 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996).
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location for its business. Hasbro, the maker of the Candyland children's
board game, brought suit under the brand new Federal Dilution Act, and
under the Washington state dilution statute. The court granted a preliminary injunction under both statutes claiming that the adult-oriented
site was likely to dilute the value of Hasbro's mark.4 9
B.

BLURRING

Dilution by blurring involves a "whittling away" of the value and
selling power of a mark by its unauthorized use. 50 In other words, using
a strong mark for unrelated purposes until it is no longer a strong mark
or until it ceases to possess its power to attribute goods and services to
their source. The Federal Dilution Act is intended to prevent only cases
where actual blurring may occur. For instance, blurring occurs where
one uses another's mark in the same specialized industry, or when both
uses are used on products intended for the general public, but not necessarily where a use is in a specialized industry and the other use is in
another unrelated specialized industry. 5 1 Unlike traditional trademark
infringement, it is not necessary that the goods or services compete, or
that there is a likelihood of confusion between the competing uses of a
mark. "Indeed, the very purpose of dilution statutes is to protect trademarks from damage caused by the use of the marks in non-competing
52
endeavors."
To find blurring under the Act, one court has found five relevant factors: "1) similarity of the trademarks and trade dress; 2) similarity of the
products; 3) sophistication of consumers; 4) renown of the senior mark
and trade dress; and 5) renown of the junior mark and trade dress." 53
While the first three factors are similar to likelihood of confusion test,
what is important to remember is that any use which increases the possibility of a mark losing its distinctiveness may constitute dilution by
54
blurring.
49. Id. Although the court did not call it dilution by tarnishment, this is precisely the
sort of use that constitutes tarnishment. See, e.g., Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corporation,
1997 WL 583395, at *15. See also Summary of Testimony of the InternationalTrademark
Association on H.R. 1295 and 1270 available in 1995 WL 435750 (July 19, 1995).
50. Panavision, 1996 WL 653726, at *7.
51. Summary of Testimony of the InternationalTrademark Association on H.R. 1295
and 1270 available in 1995 WL 435750 (July 19, 1995). See also, Megan E. Gray, Defending Against a Dilution Claim: A Practitioner'sGuide, 4 TEX. INTELL. PRoP L.J. 205, 210-211
(1996).
52. Panavision,945 F. Supp. at 1299.
53. Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 1997 WL 583395 at *14-15. See also, MerriamWebster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. 35 F.3d 65, 73 (2nd. Cir. 1994).
54. Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 1997 WL 583395 at *15 (citing Deere & Co. v.
MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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APPLYING THE LAW TO THE EXAMPLES
A.

INTERMATIC & PANAVISION

As mentioned earlier, Dennis Toeppen's speculating in domain
names has produced a number of court challenges. In the Intermatic
case, Toeppen registered intermatic.com and used it in conjunction with
the sale of some software. 55 After being challenged by the plaintiff, he
agreed to discontinue use of the name for his software, but he refused to
turn over the domain name.5 6 Instead, he put up a web page at the domain containing a map of the Champaign-Urbana, Illinois area.5 7 As
these events were occurring, the Federal Dilution Act went into effect.
In the Panavision case, Toeppen registered the name panavision.com, and used it to serve a web site containing aerial views of Pana,
Illinois. 5 s At no time did Toeppen use the panavision.com domain to sell
any goods or services. 5 9 When Panavision called asking for the name,
Toeppen offered to discontinue its use for $13,000.60 When Panavision
refused, Toeppen also reserved the domain name panaflex.com (another
Panavision trademark) and established a web site that merely contained
61
the word "hello."
Toeppen claimed that he "registered a relatively small number of
(now) controversial names, such as panavision.com and americanstandard.com, because [he] felt it would be interesting to see how the
world responded." 62 Now he knows.
Applying the law to the two cases, was there traditional trademark
infringement? The Panavision court held that because Toeppen's acts
constituted dilution under the Act there was no need to address whether
his actions amounted to state or federal trademark infringement. 6 3 In
the Intermatic case there was enough of a question as to the likelihood of
64
confusion to survive a motion for summary judgment.
The Intermatic court applied the Seventh Circuit's likelihood of confusion factors and came to the following conclusions. The Court held
55. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1232.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1232-33. Eventually this map was moved, and the only thing appearing at
the www.intermatic.com address was a notice that the Champaign-Urbana map page had
moved to a new address. Id.
58. Panavision,945 F. Supp. at 1298.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Dennis Toeppen, Usenet News Post to the group chi.internet, message ID dennis-

2611960911580001@victorville-34.net66.com,

Nov. 6, 1996 (copy on file with The John

Marshall Jounral of Computer & Information Law).
63. Panavision,945 F. Supp. at 1300.
64. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1236.
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that the marks at issue were similar-Toeppen's use of intermatic.com
and Intermatic's trademark both used the word "intermatic."6 5 This is a
reasonable finding. In determining the likelihood of confusion, one must
look at the mark as a whole. 6 6 However this does not mean that some
parts of the mark cannot be given more weight than others. For instance, if two uses of a term share generic elements, the generic elements
may be entitled to less weight than the more unique elements when
weighing whether or not there is a likelihood of confusion. 6 7 Presumably
this means that some parts of a domain name may be given more weight
to show that confusion is more or less likely to occur. If the Intermatic
company wanted to use its trademark as a domain name, it would presumably register the name in the commercial top-level domain, i.e., .com.
With some web browsers,6 8 you can type in a partial Internet address as
a destination, and the browser will make certain assumptions. If you
type in the address "intermatic" it will assume you are trying to reach
http://www.intermatic.com/. In this case the ".com" part of the "mark" is
that you
generic enough that if you leave it out, the browser will assume
69
meant to include it in the address and will add it for you.
The Court found no similarity between Toeppen and Intermatic's
products and services. At the relevant time, Toeppen had only a map of
Urbana up on a web page, and was apparently not using the domain
name to provide any other types of Internet services. Intermatic makes
programmable timers and the like, and would presumably use the Internet to establish a web page to distribute information on it's
70
products.
The next fact to consider is the area and manner of use. "This factor
requires the Court to 'consider whether there is a relationship in use,
promotion, distribution, or sales between the goods or services of the parties.'

. .

. Toeppen will not be selling any goods or services through the

intermatic.com domain." 71 The Court continued saying that it was technically possible for Intermatic to set up an Internet presence at another
address, such as intermatic-inc.com from which it display its marks and
distribute its product information.7 2 However, since Intermatic had not
set up an Internet presence at another site, it could not prove "any rela65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1235.
See, e.g., In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1058-59.
Such as, at least, Netscape Navigator version 2.0 and later.
Similarly, the "www" portion of the Internet address is assumed due to the fact

that you are accessing a World Wide Web page, which often runs on a dedicated Web server
within a domain (or at least on a "virtual host)-thus a hostname of "www" is a logical and
frequently used choice.
70. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1235.
71. Id. (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 1232.
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tionship in use, promotion, distribution, or sales between the goods or
73
services of the parties."
The Court had no evidence with which to judge the degree of care
likely to be exercised by consumers; however, the court inferred that
viewers of the Urbana map will associate the web page with Intermatic. 74 The court also found that there was no evidence of actual
confusion over Toeppen's use of the Intermatic name. 7 5
The Court held that the Intermatic mark was a strong mark. It is a
"coined" term, and it has never been used as a trade name or trademark
by any other entity. For these same reasons, the Court held that the
mark qualifies as a famous mark. 76 Famous is used in the trademark
sense, even if it does not mean common-household-name kind of fame.
As to Toeppen's intent, the Court rejected Intermatic's claim that
Toeppen's registration of more than 200 domain names indicates willful
intent to infringe. The Court stated that because this is a new law and a
77
new application of the law, Toeppen should be free to "test the waters."
Of course, while this argument may have worked the first time, at some
time the waters will have been tested...78
Turning to the Federal Dilution Act, as stated earlier, there must
first be a "famous" mark, and the use of the mark must be a "commercial
use in commerce." 79 The statute defines the term "dilution" to mean the
lessening of the capacity of the mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between
the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception. 80 In both the Panavision and Intermatic
cases, the courts found the marks to be strong marks deserving to be
protected as famous marks. 8 ' Both involve federally-registered, distinct,
coined terms, which have been extensively used and advertised nation2
wide for decades.8
73. Id. at 1235.
74. Id. at 1235-36.
75. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1236.
76. Id. at 1236 (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 831 (7th Cir.
1963)).
77. Id.
78. See also American Standard,Inc. v. Toeppen, No. 96-2147, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14451 (N.D. fli. Sept. 3, 1996). Toeppen also registered domain names such as deltairlines.com, nieman-marcus.com, britishairways.com, crateandbarrel.com, eddiebauer.com,
etc. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1230.
79. 15 U.S.C.A. §1125(c)(1) (West Supp.1996).
80. 15 U.S.C.A. §1127 (West Supp.1996). See also, Intermatic, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14878, at *32.
81. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239; Panavision,945 F. Supp. at 1229-30.
82. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239; Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1229-30.
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However, both courts found difficulty in applying traditional dilution
theories to Toeppen's conduct. The court in the Panavision case (not
demonstrating the same understanding of the relevant technology as the
court in the Intermatic case) explained that:
As a result of the current state of Internet technology, Toeppen was
able not merely:
to lessen the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services" 15 U.S.C. § 1127, but to eliminate the capacity of the
Panavision marks to identify and distinguish Panavision's goods and
services on the Internet. The Court finds that Toeppen's conduct, which
prevented Panavision from using its marks in a new and important
business medium,
has diluted Panavision's marks within the meaning
83
of the statute.
The Intermatic court also stated that Toeppen's registration prevented Intermatic from using its mark as its domain name,8 4 but the
court at least acknowledged earlier in the Intermatic opinion that Intermatic could still possibly use its mark in its domain name. 8 5 And, the
Intermatic court illustrated that the Panavision court's comment, that,
by having someone else register your mark as a domain name eliminates
your capacity to identify and distinguish your goods and services on the
Internet, is just preposterous-Intermatic (or Panavision) could set up a
86
web page at any other available domain name.
Just because a company can set up an Internet presence at a secondlevel domain name other than one that exactly matches its mark does
not mean that it may not constitute dilution for another entity to establish an Internet presence at a domain name that matches the senior
83. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1230.
84. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1233-34.
85. Id. at 1232.
86. Id. at 1232-33. This is important to understand. A company can set up, for instance, a web site to advertise and promote its trademarked product. It can even solicit
orders, and perhaps deliver certain types of goods or services over the Internet in general
and web sites in particular. This is now commonplace. Once the company has its web site
constructed, it must locate the web site somewhere on the Internet. While it may be preferable to locate a web site on a domain with a name that corresponds to the trademark, it is
in no way necessary because the web site is still the same and serves the same function,
only the address of the site is different if it is located at a different domain. With businesses pushing their products from on-line "malls" it is not necessarily uncommon to be
able to label their goods and services with their marks, yet still advertise them from someone else's domain, such as the domain of an on-line mall. As discussed earlier, a "vanity"
domain name may allow customers to guess where to find a company. Not all Internet
users find information by guesswork. "Search engines," directory listings, and other web
pages may provide "links" to the products and service's location on the Internet without a
visible reference to the domain name at which the information can be found. Similarly, non
on-line sources can provide consumers with the information necessary to find an entity's
Internet presence at whatever domain contains the mark holder's site.
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mark-holder's mark. Although Toeppen, during the relevant time period, did not sell any goods or services from either of the domains at issue, nor advertise from them,8 7 the plaintiffs could not use those
domains. Both courts saw this block as dilution because it lessened the
capacity of the marks to identify the source of goods and services on the
Internet merely because the companies could not use their marks as domain names.8 8 Technically speaking, the courts were both wrong. As
stated, dilution involves use of a mark by unauthorized parties so that
when consumers see the uses of the mark they will be less likely to attri89
bute the uses as being associated with the famous mark holder.
Merely reserving a domain name, with nothing more, is not a use of the
trademark in the statutory sense. 90 Toeppen's merely registering a
name does not make it any less likely that a consumer will think that a
Panavision product came from Panavision, or an Intermatic Product
came from Intermatic. 9 1
To the courts' credit, in these cases, however, Toeppen did more than
just reserve the names. He also used the domain names by, at a minimum, setting up web pages. This use of the domain name provides for a
better dilution claim. Had Toeppen merely registered the domain
names, the only evidence of use would be an entry in the InterNIC domain name database, and in routing computers that use the InterNIC
data. Someone trying to find the Intermatic company by guessing that
there might be a web page at http://www.intermatic.com/ would not find
one at that location or anything. However, when Toeppen established a
web page-even one as simple as a map of Pana or Urbana or the word
"hello"-he provided "goods or services" which offered an opportunity to
dilute the senior users' marks. As the court stated, "[d]ilution of Intermatic's mark is likely to occur because the domain name appears on
the web page ....

Attaching Intermatic's name to a myriad of possible

87. Id. at 1233.
88. Id. at 1240; Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1300 (defining "dilution" in 15 U.S.C.
§1127 (1996)).
89. See supra Part V.
90. Cf. Marvel Comics, Ltd. v. Defiant, a Division of Enlightened Entertainment, Ltd.,
837 F. Supp. 546, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting certain pre-registration use were adequate
uses in commerce for trademark purposes); La Societe Anonyme des Parfumes Le Galon v.
Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2nd Cir. 1974) (noting "warehousing" of name by
token use was not sufficient use in commerce to reserve rights in name); Societe De Developments Et D'Innovations Des Marches Agicoles Et Alimentares-Sodima-Union De Cooperatives Agricoles v. Intl Yogurt Co., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 839, 852 (D. Or. 1987) (stating token
use of a product for purpose of reserving name is not an adequate use for trademark
purposes).
91. Using this same analysis, the logic in the Actmedia case cited in Intermatic is
faulty. Actmedia, Inc. v. Active Media Intl, Inc., No. 96C3448, 1996 WL 466527 (N.D. Ill.
July 17, 1996) (holding that merely reserving a domain name violates 15 U.S.C. § 1125 and
Illinois common law).

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

482

[Vol. XV

messages, even something as innocuous as a map of Urbana, Illinois, is
something the Act does not permit."92 Such uses will lessen the mark's
distinctiveness, and eventually its advertising value. 9 3 This finding is
not clearly erroneous. If this constitutes a use that is genuinely likely to
cause blurring, then the "use" of the mark requirement of the Federal
Dilution Act is met.
Unfortunately for the courts, the Act requires not just a use of the
famous mark, but it requires a "commercial use in commerce" of the
94

mark.
The Intermatic court refused to hold that just because a domain is
registered in the .com domain that it necessarily means that the use of
the domain constitutes a commercial use. 95 Both the Intermatic and

Panavision courts found, however, that the statutory requirement was
still met because of Toeppen's attempts to sell the domain names even
though the web pages Toeppen established at the domain name were not
commercial uses of the marks, and therefore were not "commercial use in
96
commerce,".
Registration of a trade as a domain name, without more, is not a commercial use of the trademark and therefore is not within the prohibitions of the Act. In the case before the Court, however, Toeppen has
made commercial use of the Panavision marks. Toeppen's "business" is
to register trademarks as domain names and then to sell the domain
names to the trademarks' owners. Toeppen's business is evident from

his conduct with regard to Panavision and his conduct in registering the
domain names of many other companies. His "business" is premised on
the desire of the companies to use their trademarks as domain names
97
and the calculation that it will be cheaper to pay him than to sue him.
Merely registering a domain name, and even then offering it for sale,
does not match the definition of a use in commerce as defined in the Lanham Act. 98 The Act defines a use in commerce as follows:
92. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239.
93. Id. at 1240-41 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir.
1963)).
94. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(cXl) (West Supp. 1996).
95. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239.
96. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1229-30; Intermatic,947 F. Supp. at 1239-40.
97. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1229-30. Seealso Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239-40
(stating "Toeppen's intention to arbitrage the 'intermatic.com' domain name constitutes a
commercial use... Toeppen's desire to resell the domain name is sufficient to meet the
'commercial use' requirements of the Lanham Act"). Id.
98. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1230. "In addition, the Dilution Act itself exempts
certain uses and thereby protects parties who 'innocently' register a famous trademark as a
domain name (e.g., a citizen of Pana, Illinois who registers 'panavision.com' in order to
provide a community political forum would come under the exemption for non-commercial
use)." Id.
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The term "use in Commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in the
mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use
in commerce(1) on goods when(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or
the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed
thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or
their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of
services and the services are rendered in more than one State...
and the person rendering the99 services is engaged in commerce in
connection with the services.
Courts have held that merely registering a name in order to reserve
a right to the name is not sufficient use in commerce. The mark must be
applied to an identifiable product with an intent to distribute that product. 100 Toeppen's attempt to get money from the mark owners by selling
them the like-named domains he had registered was not a public use of
those names to identify the source of goods or services. 1 0 ' If anything,
the names were Toeppen's goods, not the label he was using as a source
identifier for his trademark-speculating services.
B.

MICROSOFT

The next example of a trademark controversy also addresses trademark law applied to domain names. Zero Micro's use of the domain
name microsOft.com, i.e. micros[zero]ft.com, was clearly an attempt to
parody the Microsoft Corporation. The domain name is a play on
Microsoft's domain name, and the contents of the web page located at the
Zero Micro domain were largely aimed at criticizing Microsoft's president
99. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West Supp. 1996).
100. See, e.g., Societe De Developments Et D'Innovations Des Marches Agicoles Et Alimentares-Sodima-Union De Cooperatives Agricoles v. International Yogurt Co., Inc., 662 F.
Supp. 839, 852 (Or. 1987).
101. Marvel Comics, Ltd. v. Defiant, a Division of Enlightened Entertainment, Ltd., 837
F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). "As for sufficient 'use in commerce,' the 'talismanic test' is
whether or not the use was 'sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked goods
in an appropriate segment of the public mind as those of the adopter of the mark." Id. at
548. See also, La Societe Anonyme des Parfumes Le Galon v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d
1265 (2d Cir. 1974).
Trademark rights are not created by sporadic, casual, and nominal shipment
of goods bearing a mark. There must be a trade in the goods sold under the mark
or at least an active and public attempt to establish such a trade... Registerable
rights cannot flow from these activities and the old adage 'no trade-no trademark' is applicable here.
Id. at 1273.
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and the company's products. Unlike in the Toeppen cases, Zero Micro
did not use a name that Microsoft wanted but could not get; rather, it
used a name that Microsoft wishes no one had or could get. While the
name may have been chosen because of its similarity to Microsoft's
mark, the use to which it was put raises some interesting issues.
The First Amendment provides some protection to trademark parodists, but that protection is not absolute. For instance, some courts have
said that the First Amendment does not necessarily convey the right to
infringe on a trademark holder's rights, as long as there are adequate
alternative means to communicate the speaker's views. 10 2 This "alternative means to communicate" test has been criticized as being too much
like the "time place and manner" test of speech limitations for restricting
speech on private property. Trademarks are not property like real estate. They are themselves a form of speech, and thus limiting a parodist's right to use a trademark regulates the content of the speech, which
does not just restrict the channel in which the parodist communicates his
10 3
or her views.
Regardless, the tests for dilution and likelihood of confusion remain
the same for a parody, such as the Zero Micro example. The two marks
at issue are similar in appearance. The "zero" within Microsoft is part of
the social commentary that the parody provides. Obviously there are
also other variants on the Microsoft domain name and mark that might
not pose quite such a close case of confusion in the mark's appearance,
04
yet which could also be used to parody Microsoft's name and mark.
As to intent of the junior user, the general rule is that if you consciously choose a mark that is already established in the marketplace,
that choice supports a finding that you are intending to trade on the sei05
nior mark's name-value, thus producing a likelihood of confusion With a true parody, "the customer would not be confused, but
amused."' 0 6 Trademark protection does not equal a right not-to-bemade-fun-of 1 0 7 "When businesses seek the national spotlight, part of
the territory includes accepting a certain amount of ridicule."' 0 8 On the
other hand, claiming "parody" is not an affirmative defense to trademark
102. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied
488 U.S. 933 (1988) [hereinafter Novak]. See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 1993).
103. See, Novak, 836 F.3d at 405-06 (dissenting opinion of Judge Heanney and works
cited therein).
104. The author has seen, for example, the terms Microsloth and Micro$oft used with
some regularity both of which would raise similar issues as those discussed here.
105. Jordache Enter., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding
Lardashe jean-parody does not infringe on Jordache trademark).
106. Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enter., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1227 (stating "Mike" shirts do not infringe on "Nike" trademark).
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infringement, it is just a factor to be weighed in the likelihood of confusion analysis.10 9
As to the similarity of the products and services to which the marks
are affixed, there is none. While both companies produce software, Zero
Micro does not use the microsOft.com mark to label its products. Zero
Micro only uses the term as a web address. Originally, the only use of
the http://www.microsOft.com/ address was the Zero Micro parody web
page. At the time this second-level domain name was in use, Zero Micro
had no product or service to label. Although Zero Micro does have a
product now, it is not distributed from the microsOft.com domain."i 0
The area of concurrent use of the mark has only slight overlap. Both
marks are used as Internet second-level domains. Zero Micro does not
put the microsOft mark on its software. Microsoft, on the other hand,
displays its mark on its software products, which enjoy world-wide distribution."' It also puts its name on everything from a television network to advertising put on the sides of city buses. It is important to note
that the parody comes about mostly because of the content of the web
site at the microsOft.com domain. While both companies have web sites,
anyone looking at either of the two is unlikely to confuse one for the
other.
If Zero Micro had been sending out e-mail from an address at the
microsOft.com domain, depending on the content of the e-mail, the likelihood of confusion might be much different. There might be an even
greater likelihood of confusion if the address was used on a file transfer
protocol archive which would likely be devoid of many of the clues that
would indicate the parodic use of the domain name. Both of these other
uses are relevant to at least the potential concurrent uses of the similar
marks.
The next factor, the strength of the complainant's mark, would not
be in doubt. Not only has the name Microsoft developed strong secondary meaning in the computer context, but it is that strength that is the
object of commentary on the Zero Micro web site.
For the purposes of this analysis, there is no evidence of actual confusion between the marks. Similarly, there is not much of a question
about Microsoft's "bridging the gap" in order to start providing parodies
of itself.
109. Id. at 1228.
110. Although, as noted, Zero Micro now uses the microsOft term as a host name within
a different second-level domain (httpV/micros0ft.paranoia.com/). See discussion infra Part
VI.D. (analyzing the significance of this use).
111. Or world-wide domination with an intent to dominate the universe, as Zero Micro

illustrates in its parody.
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Perhaps one of the most important factors in our analysis is the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers. It is how the marks are
used, and the circumstances surrounding their presentation, rather than
12
a side-by-side comparison that determines the likelihood of confusion.1 3
Consumer behavior in the relevant market is an important factor."1
assessed by looking at the soRelatedly, likelihood of confusion must be
1 14
phistication of the relevant purchasers.
People looking for the Microsoft web page are not likely to wind up
at the Zero Micro web page. If consumers try to guess where Microsoft's
web site is located, they would likely guess "http://www.microsoft.com/,"
and they would find the object of their search. In much the same analysis as that applied to telephone mnemonics, experienced Internet users
will realize that even slight differences in the spelling of a domain name
are likely to connect to a different domain. 115 The only way someone
trying to reach Microsoft's web site would accidentally happen across
Zero Micro's web site is if he or she made a non-intuitive mistype. This is
not the same case as a "zero misdial" involved with telephone mnemonics
where customers mistakenly map an "o"to a zero on the telephone
keypad. In one case, a court allowed a company to take advantage of a
"zero misdial" by using the phone number 1-800-H[zero]LIDAY, in order
to take advantage of people's confusion when trying to dial 1-800-HOLIDAY. 116 The court held that because the defendant had never advertised its number by using the numbers that made it appear to be the
plaintiffs, they did not create any confusion-they merely took advantage of the confusion that was inherent in the plaintiffs telephone
number. 11 7 This is not quite the same situation as the Zero Micro case
because there is no inherent confusion of which to take advantage. The
confusion in the telephone context occurs in the translation of letters on
the keypad to the underlying numbers. While such confusion is possible
in the domain name context, it would presumably be much more unusual. Another reason put forth by one commentator, arguing that the
112. Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.denied 439
U.S. 1132, (holding that "counter-culture" displays of Disney characters were less likely to
induce confusion when the cartoon parodies could only be found in counter-culture stores
not likely to deal in Disney Production). See also Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House,
Inc. 35 F.3d 65, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that publisher failed to show likelihood of
confusion necessary to support trade dress infringement claim); Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v.
Cosmair, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1547, 1555 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating "Notorious" for shoes does
not infringe on "Notorious" mark used for perfume).
113. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 1996).
114. Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Denarius, Ltd., 817 F.
Supp 1103, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
115. Cf Bell v. Kidan, 836 F. Supp. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
116. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservations, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 625 (6th Cir. 1996).
117. Id.
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domains are confusingly similar and likely to cause confusion, is that
because the "0" and "" keys are adjacent to each other on a standard
keyboard they are more likely to produce an unintentional mistype.1 1 8
Regardless, should consumers mistakenly end up at the Zero Micro
site rather than the Microsoft site in their efforts to buy computer
software, they will not find it. Rather, they will find a web page criticizing Microsoft, which clearly indicates that it is not endorsed by
Microsoft. Therefore, Zero Micro's use of the micros0ft.com domain is
unlikely to confuse consumers.
Once again, this analysis may be different for a nonweb-based use of
the micros0ft.com domain. For instance, it is possible that even seasoned Internet users would mistake e-mail from the Zero Micro domain
as being from the Microsoft domain unless there was something about
the content of the e-mail message to make the Internet user examine the
e-mail address more carefully.
The next issue is whether or not the domain name dilutes
Microsoft's mark. The Federal Dilution Act specifically exempts uses of a
famous mark that are non-commercial, 1 19 and even more specifically,0
12
uses of the mark for "[a]ll forms of news reporting and commentary."
Discussing the legislative history of the Act, the Panavisioncourt stated
This exclusion encompasses conduct such as parodies and consumer
product reviews. According to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah), the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, '[tihe bill will not prohibit or
threaten noncommercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial
and other forms
of expression that are not a part of a commercial
12 1
transaction.'
In fact, some courts have stated that it is hard to find that a parodist's use of a mark constitutes blurring, because a successful parody re12 2
quires the continued association of the mark with the mark's holder.
Some courts have gone so far as to say that parody tends to increase
public identification of a parodied mark with its initial creator, and thus
does not cause a loss of distinctiveness. 1 23 Even where there is some risk
that a parodist's use of a mark may pose a dilution risk, the risk is often
118. Albert, supra note 9, at 277. Barger, supra note 9 at 644. As an aside, on a "nonstandard" keyboard, such as a Dvorak keyboard (which lays out the keys logically, unlike
the traditional "QWERTY" keyboard which arranges the keys in a design specifically intended to result in slower typing) the "o" and the "0"are at opposite ends of the keyboard.
119. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(cX4)(B) (West Supp. 1996).
120. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1996).
121. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1229-30
122. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 1995 WL 567369, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (holding that muppet tribal boar-warrior does not dilute mark of canned meat
product).
123. JordacheEnter., Inc., 828 F.2d at 1489 (holding that lower courts finding was not
clearly erroneous).
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tolerated in the interests of maintaining broad opportunities for
expression. 124

Similarly, parody of a mark does not tarnish the mark if the public
associates the two marks only for the purposes of the parody, and does
not associate the two sources of the
products. 125 The confusion of the
12 6
tarnishment.
two sources produces
With this reasoning, any use of the microsOft.com domain name, so
long as it is used as a noncommercial parody of Microsoft, is not likely to
dilute the mark under the Act. This is not to say that the domain name
could not be used in a manner which would dilute Microsoft's trademark,
but the particular use to which Zero Micro initially put the domain name
is not an infringing case.
Perhaps the better example of a use of a mark that is likely to cause
dilution (and perhaps likelihood of confusion as well) is with something
like a "vanity" address being pitched to university alumni. A University,
such as Purdue, is likely to have a domain such as purdue.edu. 12 7 The
top level domain shows that it is a United States university. The secondlevel domain shows that it is Purdue. If a company registers a domain
such as purdue.com or purdue-university.com, and starts selling e-mail
accounts to Purdue University alumni, there may be a much stronger
case for a dilution claim.128
C.

HONDA.PURDUE.EDU

For the last two examples, rather than step through a complete
analysis, some of the issues that distinguish these examples from the
examples that have already been presented will be used.
When a mark is used as a hostname, rather than as a second level
domain name, the chances of consumers being confused drops, and perhaps drops noticeably. "Unauthorized third party use does not necessarily diminish the strength of a mark. The significance of third party use is
evaluated based on the entire name and symbol, the type of business in
which it is used, and geographic location." 129 The proper inquiry, therefore, is whether another party's use of the mark diminishes the power of
124. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating parodic use of
mark in advertising was likely to cause dilution).
125. JordacheEnter., Inc., 828 F.2d at 1491.
126. Id.

127. <httpJ/www.purdue.edu>.
128. Under the Federal Dilution Act this assumes that Purdue University has trademark rights in its name and that its mark constitutes a famous mark for purposes of the
statute.
129. Breakers of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Intl Beach Hotel Dev., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 1576,
1583 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that hotel with similar names as that of another hotel may
cause confusion).
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13 0
the mark to identify the goods and services of the mark's owner.
In the context of a mark used as a host name or third-level domain
name, the decrease in likelihood of confusion is due to the pairing of the
mark used as a hostname with a second-level domain which belongs to
another organization. Some cases have held that when a mark is paired
with another "house mark" which also identifies the source of the product, "the use of a strong house mark virtually precludes confusion between similar marks." 13 1 Adding any additional terms to a mark may
work to dispel any confusion with a senior mark.132
Thus, in our example, although "honda" may be a trademark of the
car company of the same name, it is clearly paired with the source-identifier belonging to Purdue (and even further listed under an educational
top-level domain). On the other hand, as mentioned, likelihood of confusion protects against not only misattribution of source, but also against
misattribution of sponsorship or endorsement. 13 3 In the case of a public
University with a host named after a large multinational corporation,
there is the possibility of Internet users believing that the host was
named on behalf of the mark as a recognition of the companies charitable
contributions, or as a result of corporate research being done on behalf of
the corporation.
Ownership of a name is not the only thing that produces a possible
trademark infringement, but also the use to which that name is put that
produces any conflict. For the use of a name to produce a false or confusing designation of origin, the name must be used in a trademark sense as
found in sections 32134 and 43(a) 135 of the Lanham Act (as discussed earlier). If the mark is only used to identify a machine in a computer lab for
network data-routing purposes, there is not likely to be a likelihood of
confusion. On the other hand, if the machine is used to host a web page
describing the University engineering department's new concept car, the
"honda" hostname is more likely to cause confusion.
130. Id.
131. Victory Pipe Craftsmen, Inc. v. Fabrege, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 551, 557 (N.D. Ill. 1984)

(holding that trademark is not likely to cause confusion when it is paired with the Fabrege
trademark).
132. Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1546, 1557
(S.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that fictional company "Starbrite Batteries" does not infringe on
"Star Brite" trademark); McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prod., 787 F.2d 1163, 1168-69
(7th Cir. 1986) (stating movie character TRON not likely to be confused with fuse TRON
Buss). But C.f Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that telephone number 1-800-MATTRES confusingly similar to (area code)
MATTRESS).
133. Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, 748 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir. 1984).
134. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (West Supp. 1996).
135. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West Supp. 1996).
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For the use of the mark as a third-level name to constitute dilution
under the Act, once again, there must be a commercial use in commerce.
There also must be actual dilution.13 6 If the selling power of the senior
mark is not reduced by the use, then the use does not constitute dilution.
D.

WWW.NEXCHI.COM/-SONY/

The last example addresses a mark used at a different spot in an
Internet address, that of the user name.
The analysis here is not significantly different than that just made.
In the case of the mark as a user name, whether there is confusion depends on how the account is used. If the account is not used, there will
be nothing to confuse consumers. If the account is used, the manner of
use will indicate whether confusion is likely to result. In the example of
a UserID "sony" consumers are not likely, based on the address alone, to
believe that, say, e-mail coming from sony@nexchi.com is coming from
the electronics giant (unlike e-mail coming from user@sony.com which
rightfully should be so attributed). Similarly, if someone sets up a web
page at "http://www.nexchi.com/-sony/" consumers are not likely to accidentally happen across the web site. Even if they do, as is the case of email, the Sony mark is clearly coupled with the name of another entity,
which, as discussed earlier, is likely to reduce the likelihood of confusion.
It is worth noting, however, that this analysis may change for a company without its own second-level domain name. In this case, mail sent
from say widgets@service-provider-l.com could be confused with the real
company which uses the same user name at a different provider (widgets@service-provider-2.com).
As to whether use of a mark as a user name constitutes dilution, the
analysis does not differ significantly from that mentioned in the last section concerning marks used as host names: there must be a use in commerce, and it must be a use that is likely to cause dilution. The actual
use made of the account bearing the trademark as a UserID will determine whether there is dilution under the Act.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The types of conflicts arising over Internet addresses are not unique
problems. For instance "vanity" license plates present an analogous situation. While for a license plate the commercial use in commerce requirement is missing, there are fees to acquire such a license plate, and under
136. Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 1996 WL 511639, at *5 (S.D. Miss. May 3,
1996). See also Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983); Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. 35 F.3d 65, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1994); Tiffany & Co. v.
Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 843 (D. Mass. 1964) (holding that creation of a Tiffany's restaurant infringes on the Tiffany mark owned by the jewelry manufacturer).
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an Intermatic-type analysis a court could (incorrectly) find a violation. In
addition, Bell Research is also now allowing people to reserve "555" numbers, allowing for seven digit phone numbers with national coverage
(such as 555-TAXI), just like numbers with an area code of "800" or "888"
which are already common.13 7 These national phone numbers bear a resemblance to domain names, and similar conflicts may arise.
The controversies that have erupted over domain names have drawn
attention to the problem, and the domain name and domain registration
system is being examined and modified to hopefully lessen the potential
conflicts. A proposal which will soon be implemented involves the creation of new generic top-level domains in order to allow for better classification of second-level domain name holders. 138 However, by adding new
top-level domains, while second-level domain name conflicts will be reduced, they are unlikely to be eliminated. Furthermore, claims may
shift to conflicts over ownership of top-level domains, as illustrated by
the fact that some organizations have already created new top level-domains and operate registries even without having received the IANA's
39
stamp of approval.1
By mechanisms such as the law described in this article, coupled
with contractual obligations imposed by the domain name registries,
much of the conflict arising over domain names can be addressed. Infringing uses likely to cause confusion can clearly be stopped. Uses
which dilute a famous mark can be stopped using the Federal Dilution
Act, though there still must be a mechanism to address dilution of a famous mark where the dilution occurs in a domain used or registered
outside the jurisdiction of the United States. To prevent domain name
"squatting," if contractual obligations with the domain registries require
certain minimum use of the domain, without which the domain will be
forfeited back to the registry, then attempts to arbitrage domain names
should be reduced. If the domain is not used, the domain reverts back to
the registry. If the domain name is used, as required by a registry contract, then the use runs the risk of running afoul of the trademark law,
and thus become enjoined. At this point the domain name is not being
used as required by the contract with the registry, thus reverting back to
the registry's control and away from the speculator.

137. Mike Mills, The Prefix That Didn'tRing True, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1996, at CO.
138. See, e.g. Int'l Ad Hoc CommitteeFinal report of the intl ad hoc corn: recommendations for administration and mangement of gTLDs(2.4.97) <http:J/www.iahc.org>.
139. See, e.g., David Loundy, Internet Name Game Gets New Set of Rules, CH. DAILY L.
BULL., Sept. 12, 1996, at 5 (discussing domain conflicts).

